Kearney

This case sits at the intersection of change / operations / people and motivation; capability; opportunity; norms. I selected it because the company presents a useful real-world setting in which human behaviour can plausibly alter a measurable business outcome.

Transformation programmes often fail because the organisation changes processes before changing behaviour and incentives.

The company-authored source, Kearney AI Trends Report 2026, is the factual anchor for this case. It establishes: Kearney's 2026 AI trends research provides a company-authored basis for examining AI trends, adoption and transformation priorities. The source is used to establish the public context; it does not by itself prove the internal causal diagnosis proposed below. Exact company source: Kearney AI Trends Report 2026 [Claim-grade]

My reading of the opportunity is not that the organisation simply needs “more psychology.” The executive issue is the interaction between change / operations / people, human behaviour and an economically meaningful outcome. The public evidence gives a starting signal; the analytical task is to determine whether the mechanism behind that signal is actually motivation; capability; opportunity; norms, or whether process design, incentives, technology, market conditions or measurement are contributing more strongly.

Motivation; capability; opportunity; norms is the proposed mechanism. The important test is whether manipulating that mechanism changes behaviour and then changes the business outcome. Psychology is therefore treated as an explanatory and intervention discipline, not as decoration.

I would build Build a behavioural adoption programme with stakeholder segmentation, friction mapping, manager nudges and adoption measurement.. The point would be to turn the observation into an operating capability rather than a one-off recommendation. The intervention would first establish a baseline, segment the relevant population/workflows, identify the highest- friction or highest-value moments, test competing explanations, and then run a controlled pilot against a pre-agreed decision threshold.

The primary scorecard would begin with Adoption; error rate; cycle time; sentiment. I would add four layers: an outcome metric, a behavioural leading indicator, an operational/financial measure, and a risk or guardrail measure. The intervention should be scaled only if all four tell a coherent story.

If I were embedded in the relevant change / operations / people function, I would not begin by asking for permission to write a longer report. I would ask for the minimum internal data needed to validate the hypothesis: the relevant behavioural/transactional funnel, segment definitions, operational constraints, existing interventions, outcome metrics and known governance boundaries. I would then build a short hypothesis tree and identify the smallest experiment capable of distinguishing between the leading explanations.

The distinctive contribution I would aim to make is to connect three levels that are often separated: what people do, why they may be doing it, and what the organisation should change because of it. For Kearney, that means translating motivation; capability; opportunity; norms into an executive decision rather than leaving it as a psychological observation.

Any use of behavioural, employee, customer or transaction data would require appropriate purpose limitation, data minimisation, access controls, retention rules, fairness review, accountability and applicable legal/regulatory review. This portfolio identifies questions and designs; it does not pretend to possess internal data or provide legal advice.

Measurement & causality; Adaptation & learning

This company appears in the following industry-level problem threads: